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dc.contributor.authorAlbanese, Giuseppeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSorge, Marco M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38874-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker - and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,23en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelH11en_US
dc.subject.jelH49en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIllegal lobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous policy makingen_US
dc.subject.keywordJudicial controlen_US
dc.subject.stwJustizen_US
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe role of the judiciary in the public decision making processen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn627600794en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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