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Title:Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties PDF Logo
Authors:Bade, Sophie
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,22
Abstract:The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result.
Subjects:Uncertainty Aversion
Multiple Priors
Median Voter
Electoral Competition over many Issues
JEL:D72
D81
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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