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| Title: | | Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties  |
| Authors: | | Bade, Sophie |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,22 |
| Abstract: | | The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result. |
| Subjects: | | Uncertainty Aversion Multiple Priors Median Voter Electoral Competition over many Issues |
| JEL: | | D72 D81 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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