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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-10en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38871-
dc.description.abstractIn their majority, public international lawyers postulate that for a new rule of customary law to originate, two conditions must be fulfilled: there must be consistent practice, and it must be shown that this practice is motivated by the belief that such behaviour is required in law. Maurice Mendelson (Recueil des Cours 272 (1998) 155) has challenged this view. He believes that the majority view ignores the fundamentally incomplete nature of public international law. He claims that the new rule emerges because mere practice leads to convergent expectations. This paper uses data from student experiments with a linear public good to show that behaviour con-verges even absent verbal communication; that convergence is guided by mean contributions in the previous round, which serve as an implicit norm; that freeriding on this implicit norm is re-garded as illegitimate; that cooperation can be stabilised at a high level if 'reprisals' are permitted. Hence the mechanism of norm formation proposed by Maurice Mendelson is fully borne out by the experimental data.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,13en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelK33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwGewohnheitsrechten_US
dc.subject.stwInternationales Rechten_US
dc.subject.stwErwartungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleAn experimental contribution to the theory of customary (international) lawen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn625803604en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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