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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38870
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Engel, Christoph | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-29 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-18T11:11:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-18T11:11:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38870 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Over the last 25 years, more than a hundred dictator game experiments have been published. This meta study summarizes the evidence. Exploiting the fact that most experiments had to fix parameters they did not intend to test, the meta study explores a rich set of control variables for multivariate analysis. It shows that Tobit models (assuming that dictators would even want to take money) and hurdle models (assuming that the decision to give a positive amount is separate from the choice of amount, conditional on giving) outperform mere meta-regression and OLS. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,07 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C24 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D03 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rationales Verhalten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Meta-Analyse | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Tobit-Modell | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Dictator games: A meta study | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 622756745 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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