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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868-
dc.description.abstractWe study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian model so as to include a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main results are the following: first, the possibility of preference shocks yields a new set of collective incentive constraints. Productivity shocks have no such implication. Second, the optimal policy gives rise to a positive correlation between the public-goods provision level, the extent of redistribution and marginal tax rates.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,18en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Taxationen
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwVerteilungspolitiken
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten
dc.subject.stwSchocken
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwVersorgungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocks-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627561519en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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