Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:41Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:41Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38868-
dc.description.abstractWe study how an optimal income tax and an optimal public-goods provision rule respond to preference and productivity shocks. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. We therefore extend the Mirrleesian model so as to include a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main results are the following: first, the possibility of preference shocks yields a new set of collective incentive constraints. Productivity shocks have no such implication. Second, the optimal policy gives rise to a positive correlation between the public-goods provision level, the extent of redistribution and marginal tax rates.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,18en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwVerteilungspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSchocken_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwVersorgungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal income taxation and public-goods provision with preference and productivity shocksen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn627561519en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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