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dc.contributor.authorGrechenig, Kristoffelen_US
dc.contributor.authorSekyra, Michaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:11Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:11Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864-
dc.description.abstractWe address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for small shareholders.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,15en_US
dc.subject.jelK22en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDerivative Shareholder Suitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPercentage Limitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordCollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordMonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordFree Ridingen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwAktionäreen_US
dc.subject.stwZivilprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwAgency Theoryen_US
dc.subject.stwEuropaen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleNo derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn627560288en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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