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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Grechenig, Kristoffel | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sekyra, Michael | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-06-09 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-18T11:11:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-18T11:11:11Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38864 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of derivate share-holder suits. We explain this phenomenon on the basis of percentage limits which require share-holders to hold a minimum amount of shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, managers will collude with large shareholders by means of settlements or bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for small shareholders. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,15 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K22 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K42 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Derivative Shareholder Suits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Percentage Limits | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Collusion | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Monitoring | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Free Riding | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Corporate Governance | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Aktionäre | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zivilprozess | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Führungskräfte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Multinationales Unternehmen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Agency Theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Europa | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | USA | | en_US |
| dc.title | | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 627560288 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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