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dc.contributor.authorHennig-Schmidt, Heikeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSelten, Reinharden_US
dc.contributor.authorWiesen, Danielen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-17T12:28:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-17T12:28:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38799-
dc.description.abstractA central concern in health economics is to understand the influence of commonly used physician payment systems. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyze the influence of fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP) payments on physicians' behavior. Medical students decide as experimental physicians on the quantity of medical services. Real patients gain a monetary benefit from their choices. Our main findings are that patients are overserved in FFS and underserved in CAP. Financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity decisions, though. The patient benefit is of considerable importance as well. Patients are affected differently by the two payment systems. Those in need of a low level of medical services are better off under CAP, whereas patients with a high need of medical services gain more health benefit when physicians are paid by FFS.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherGraduate School of Economics Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBonn econ discussion papers 2009,29en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelI11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPhysician payment systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordfee-for-serviceen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapitationen_US
dc.subject.stwÄrzteen_US
dc.subject.stwArzthonoraren_US
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen_US
dc.subject.stwGesundheitsversorgungen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwGesundheitsprämieen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleHow payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour: An experimental investigationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn621695491en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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