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Title:How payment systems affect physicians' provision behaviour: An experimental investigation PDF Logo
Authors:Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Selten, Reinhard
Wiesen, Daniel
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Bonn econ discussion papers 2009,29
Abstract:A central concern in health economics is to understand the influence of commonly used physician payment systems. We introduce a controlled laboratory experiment to analyze the influence of fee-for-service (FFS) and capitation (CAP) payments on physicians' behavior. Medical students decide as experimental physicians on the quantity of medical services. Real patients gain a monetary benefit from their choices. Our main findings are that patients are overserved in FFS and underserved in CAP. Financial incentives are not the only motivation for physicians' quantity decisions, though. The patient benefit is of considerable importance as well. Patients are affected differently by the two payment systems. Those in need of a low level of medical services are better off under CAP, whereas patients with a high need of medical services gain more health benefit when physicians are paid by FFS.
Subjects:Physician payment system
laboratory experiment
incentives
fee-for-service
capitation
JEL:C91
I11
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn

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