Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38740
Authors: 
Kruse, Jörn
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapierreihe // Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre 94
Abstract: 
As a result of the prevailing governance structure, economic policy in democracies usually suffers from specific deficiencies. Among these are the predominance of distributive over efficiency objectives, the neglect of long-run effects, and the lack of or biased use of expert knowledge in the political decision making process. These deficiencies can be attributed to a 'monopoly of democratic legitimacy' of the politicians and parties, an overloaded democratic delegation, the influence of interest groups, and the short-run incentives in the political process. The focus of this paper is on the reform of the governance structure of economic policy. It is suggested that a 'dual democratic legitimacy' should be introduced. A 'senate' which is independent of the political parties will be directly elected by the people. The senate firstly works as a second chamber in bicameralistic legislation, closely cooperating with consultative expert institutions. Secondly, the senate acts as a principal for any public institution outside of the parliament and the government, appointing the top personnel.
Subjects: 
Delegation
Politische Institutionen
Zwei-Kammer-Systeme
Senat
JEL: 
D72
D02
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
500.34 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.