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dc.contributor.authorHorgos, Danielen_US
dc.contributor.authorZimmermann, Klaus W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T12:18:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T12:18:45Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20930en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38718-
dc.description.abstractWith interest groups significantly affecting economic performance (according to Mancur Olson) and a vital interest of governments in economic growth and low unemployment in order to win elections, there should be a link between political business cycles and the evolution of lobbies over time which has totally been ignored in the literature up to now. In modeling this link in a theoretical and empirical way we try to answer two questions: Is it possible to interpret Olson's Law of Interest Groups not only as a long run phenomenon but also in a short-run perspective, integrating it into the theory of political business cycles? And: is there any empirical evidence that a typical pattern of lobby behavior and macroeconomic status exists which is consistent over a couple of election periods? In order to investigate these issues, we first analyze some literature that is usually ignored in the more technical contributions evaluating Olson´s law, but proves to be highly important as background for answering the above mentioned questions. We then illustrate how a model consisting of Olson´s interest-groups theory and the endeavors of governments to win the majority of votes in elections could look like, before we perform a time-series-analysis based on the lobby-list of the German Bundestag in order to gain some more insights into the relationships between lobbies, governments and voters. As a result we discover a consistent behavior of the lobbies over the cycle that boils down to some kind of non-aggression pact between the lobbies and the governments irrespective of their political alignments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherHelmut-Schmidt-Univ. Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionspapierreihe // Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre 98en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinterest groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical business cyclesen_US
dc.subject.keywordgrowthen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordinflationen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenvertretungen_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konjunkturzyklusen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftswachstumen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwInflationen_US
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden_US
dc.titleIt takes two to Tango: Lobbies and the political business cycleen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn608266264en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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