Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38708
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dc.contributor.authorNocke, Volkeren_US
dc.contributor.authorWhinston, Michael D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:27:02Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:27:02Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38708-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority towards horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger will affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, the characteristics of which may not yet be known to the antitrust authority. We show that, in many cases, this apparently difficult problem has a simple resolution: an antitrust authority can maximize discounted consumer surplus by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger today if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ. |cEvanston, Ill.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO working paper |x0099en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwKartellrechten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwFusionen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumentenrenteen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleDynamic merger reviewen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn597597197en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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