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dc.contributor.authorSweeting, Andrewen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-13T08:26:14Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-13T08:26:14Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38652-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that generators exercised increasing market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s despite declining market concentration. It examines whether this was consistent with static, non-cooperative oligopoly models, which are widely used to model electricity markets, by testing the static Nash equilibrium assumption that each generator chose its bids to maximize its current profits taking the bids of other generators as given. It finds a significant change in behavior in late 1996. In 1995 and 1996 generator behavior was consistent with the static Nash equilibrium assumption if the majority of their output was covered by financial contracts which hedged prices. After 1996 their behavior was inconsistent with the static Nash equilibrium assumption given their contract cover but it was consistent with tacit collusion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ. Evanston, Ill.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSIO working paper 0048en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL94en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordstatic oligopoly modelsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarket poweren_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordelectricity marketsen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwEnglanden_US
dc.subject.stwWalesen_US
dc.titleMarket power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market, 1995 - 2000en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn505135140en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University

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