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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers three firms that engage in an R&D contest to develop a new profitable technology. For a broad range of parameters, the firm that leads the contest (i.e., has the highest probability of success) is better-off licensing or selling its superior interim knowledge to one of the two lagging firms or to both rather than holding on to its lead. Although transferring interim R&D knowledge to the lagging firms erodes the technological lead of the leading firm, it allows it to extract rents from its rivals and can possibly create value by increasing the chance that the licensee(s) will develop the new technology when the leading firm fails.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ. Evanston, Ill.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCSIO working paper 0088en_US
dc.subject.keywordInterim R&D knowledgeen_US
dc.subject.keywordexclusive and nonexclusive licensingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtransfer of knowledgeen_US
dc.titleLicensing interim R&D knowledgeen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CSIO Electronic Working Papers, Northwestern University

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