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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/3811
  

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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.contributor.authorNunnenkamp, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorThiele, Raineren_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-28T14:17:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-28T14:17:08Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/3811-
dc.description.abstractUsing panel data for 143 countries over the period 1973-2002, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of US aid on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We use disaggregated aid data to account for the fact that various forms of aid may differ in their ability to induce political support by recipients. We obtain strong evidence that US aid buys voting compliance in the Assembly. More specifically, our results suggest that general budget support and untied grants are the major aid categories by which recipients have been induced to vote in line with the United States. When replicating the analysis for other G7 donors, no comparable patterns emerge.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKieler Arbeitspapiere 1275en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.subject.keywordBilateral Aiden_US
dc.subject.keywordUN General Assembly-
dc.subject.keywordVoting-
dc.subject.stwBilaterale Entwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwAmerikanischen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleDoes US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn511206569en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW

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