Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37528
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dc.contributor.authorErlei, Mathiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorReinhold, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:04:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:04:20Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37528-
dc.description.abstractHart and Moore (2008) argue that varying degrees of flexibility in contracts induce differing reference points and aspiration levels for parties' shares of a transactions total surplus. As a consequence, a trade-off between adaptational flexibility and the prevention of distributional conflicts emerges. In a recent paper Fehr et al. (2009b) analyze a buyer-seller-relationship with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the sellers' cost level to test these effects. We rerun their experiment and introduce another treatment with exogenously determined contract types. Like FHZ we find reference point effects in both treatments. However, uncooperative shading behavior in our treatments differs substantially from the one described in FHZ. Furthermore, it makes a significant difference whether contract types are determined by buyers or determined exogenously. We explain this by introducing two further effects, a reciprocity effect and a signaling effect.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Incentives and Contracts |xG10-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD01en_US
dc.subject.jelD23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcontractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordreference pointsen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.titleTo Choose or Not to Choose: Contracts, Reference Points, Reciprocity, and Signalingen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn655007679-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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