Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517
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dc.contributor.authorGerrits, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorBeckmann, Klausen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:03:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:03:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37517-
dc.description.abstractIt is the prevailing approach in the public choice literature to model lobbying and corruption in the same manner. On the contrary, we attempt to capture both in the same framework (auction theory), but using different modelling approaches. We present a unified framework in which some interesting conclusions ensue, not the least the possibility of a benign view on corruption as in Besley (2006).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences |xE17-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleAuctioning off a favour: corruption and lobbying in a combo modelen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn65515910X-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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