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Title:Auctioning off a favour: corruption and lobbying in a combo model PDF Logo
Authors:Gerrits, Carsten
Beckmann, Klaus
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences E17-V2
Abstract:It is the prevailing approach in the public choice literature to model lobbying and corruption in the same manner. On the contrary, we attempt to capture both in the same framework (auction theory), but using different modelling approaches. We present a unified framework in which some interesting conclusions ensue, not the least the possibility of a benign view on corruption as in Besley (2006).
JEL:D72
D73
K42
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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