Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37514 
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dc.contributor.authorKölle, Felixen
dc.contributor.authorSliwka, Dirken
dc.contributor.authorZhou, Nannanen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:09:29Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:09:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37514-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the effects of wealth inequality on the incentives to contribute to a public good or a team output when agents are inequity averse. We show that inequality may increase total output when it favors the more able agents. Moreover, the more inequity averse the agents, the larger should be the inequality in wealth if total output is to be maximized.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Formation and Performance of Teams |xF12-V2en
dc.subject.jelM50en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.jelD31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPublic gooden
dc.subject.keywordteam incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordinequity aversionen
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keywordwage settingen
dc.titleInequality and Team Performance-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654888140en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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