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dc.contributor.authorBartling, Björnen_US
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Klausen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:10:38Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:10:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37503-
dc.description.abstractIn recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Organisational Design B15-V3en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelJ30en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordjob designen_US
dc.subject.keywordhigh-performance work systemsen_US
dc.subject.keywordscreeningen_US
dc.subject.keywordreputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordtrusten_US
dc.subject.keywordcontrolen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcomplementaritiesen_US
dc.titleScreening, Competition, and Job Designen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn65481953X-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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