EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37503
  
Title:Screening, Competition, and Job Design PDF Logo
Authors:Bartling, Björn
Fehr, Ernst
Schmidt, Klaus
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Organisational Design B15-V3
Abstract:In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees.
Subjects:job design
high-performance work systems
screening
reputation
competition
trust
control
social preferences
complementarities
JEL:C91
D80
J30
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
VfS_2010_pid_271.pdf287.53 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37503

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.