Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37495 
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dc.contributor.authorWohlschlegel, Ansgaren
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:09Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2010-08-11T08:53:09Z; end=2010-10-26-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37495-
dc.description.abstractWholesale contracts with loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes are of particular concern in legal cases of abuse of market power. Competition authorities complain that an incumbent manufacturer may use the lock-in effect of such long-term contracts with a retailer to impede subsequent entry or even prevent it. This paper analyzes an incumbent manufacturer using a long-term contract to shift rent from an entrant who can produce only in later periods. If contracts can only be made contingent on total own quantities, the incumbent's pre-entry (post-entry) quantity will be excessive (inefficiently small) even under the otherwise most general set of contracts. The model permits the analysis of simple pricing schemes widely used in practice. In particular, I show that all-unit discounts outperform incremental discounts both from the incumbent's and a social point of view, although competition authorities tend to take a more skeptical view towards the former.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies |xF8-V1en
dc.subject.jelD80en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordAbuse of Market Dominanceen
dc.subject.keywordDiscountsen
dc.subject.keywordExclusive Dealingen
dc.titleLoyalty-Rewarding Pricing Schemes: Contract Space and Rent Shifting-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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