EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37495
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorWohlschlegel, Ansgaren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T08:53:09Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2010-08-11T08:53:09Z; end=2010-10-26-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37495-
dc.description.abstractWholesale contracts with loyalty-rewarding pricing schemes are of particular concern in legal cases of abuse of market power. Competition authorities complain that an incumbent manufacturer may use the lock-in effect of such long-term contracts with a retailer to impede subsequent entry or even prevent it. This paper analyzes an incumbent manufacturer using a long-term contract to shift rent from an entrant who can produce only in later periods. If contracts can only be made contingent on total own quantities, the incumbent's pre-entry (post-entry) quantity will be excessive (inefficiently small) even under the otherwise most general set of contracts. The model permits the analysis of simple pricing schemes widely used in practice. In particular, I show that all-unit discounts outperform incremental discounts both from the incumbent's and a social point of view, although competition authorities tend to take a more skeptical view towards the former.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Regulation and Pricing Policies F8-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelL42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAbuse of Market Dominanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordDiscountsen_US
dc.subject.keywordExclusive Dealingen_US
dc.titleLoyalty-Rewarding Pricing Schemes: Contract Space and Rent Shiftingen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.

No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.