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dc.contributor.authorSchneider, Maiken_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:09:26Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:09:26Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37483-
dc.description.abstractWe examine lobby influence on policy outcomes in a legislative vote-buying model with two competing lobbyists and endogenous policy proposals. We compare two polar cases: (1) the committee or (2) the lobbyist seeking policy change writes the bill. Surprisingly we find that if the salience of the issue is low, the committee proposes more extreme policy changes than the pro-policy-change lobbyist even though the policy preferences of the committee are more moderate. The opposite is true if salience is high. We also show that the extreme proposals when salience is low do not necessarily involve lower welfare relative to the lobbyist's proposal.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Political Economy: Lobbying and Preferences E17-V1en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislative lobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislaturesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.titleBlackmailing Lobbyistsen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654890250-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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