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Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Roider, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Englmaier, Florian | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Mühlheusser, Gerd | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-11T08:56:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-11T08:56:15Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37476 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We investigate a moral hazard model with a one-sided commitment problem. That is, after effort provision, the agent is free to either stay with the principal or to leave and pursue his (ex-post) outside option, the value of which is increasing in effort. Depending on parameters, optimal contracts have interesting properties, such as first-best effort incentives, nonresponsiveness to underlying parameters, or inefficient separation. Moreover, the agent might suffer from a ceteris paribus improvement of his outside option. Potential applications of this framework include employment relationships and venture capital financing. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Verein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Incentives A8-V1 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K31 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | M52 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | moral hazard | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | limited commitment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | ex-post outside option | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | limited liability | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Conference Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 655840753 | | - |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie
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