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dc.contributor.authorSchmidt, Robert Christianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:11:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:11:47Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37457-
dc.description.abstractEmission allowances are often distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme (grandfathering) to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. If the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time, firms may nevertheless relocate to countries with a lower carbon price once the competitive disadvantage of their home industry becomes sufficiently high. We show that this is not necessarily the case. A temporary grandfathering policy can be a sufficient instrument to avert relocation in the long run, even if immediate relocation would be profitable in the absence of grandfathering. A necessary condition for this is that the permit price triggers investments in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Environmental Policy: Incentives and Instruments |xF18-V2en
dc.subject.jelQ55en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordclimate policyen
dc.subject.keywordemissions tradingen
dc.subject.keywordgrandfatheringen
dc.subject.keywordleakageen
dc.subject.keywordcap-and-tradeen
dc.titleCarbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert relocation-
dc.typeConference Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654592969en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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