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Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37457
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Schmidt, Robert Christian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-11T09:11:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-11T09:11:47Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37457 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Emission allowances are often distributed for free in an early phase of a cap-and-trade scheme (grandfathering) to reduce adverse effects on the profitability of firms. If the grandfathering scheme is phased out over time, firms may nevertheless relocate to countries with a lower carbon price once the competitive disadvantage of their home industry becomes sufficiently high. We show that this is not necessarily the case. A temporary grandfathering policy can be a sufficient instrument to avert relocation in the long run, even if immediate relocation would be profitable in the absence of grandfathering. A necessary condition for this is that the permit price triggers investments in low-carbon technologies or abatement capital. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Verein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Environmental Policy: Incentives and Instruments F18-V2 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | climate policy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | emissions trading | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | grandfathering | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | leakage | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | cap-and-trade | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to avert relocation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Conference Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 654592969 | | - |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie
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