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Title:Overconfidence Can Improve an Agent's Relative and Absolute Performance in Contests PDF Logo
Authors:Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems G15-V1
Abstract:This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms.
Subjects:Overconfidence
Contests
JEL:D21
D44
D82
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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