Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37440
Authors: 
Ludwig, Sandra
Wichardt, Philipp C.
Wickhorst, Hanke
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Principal Agent Problems G15-V1
Abstract: 
This paper suggests a potential rationale for the recent empirical finding that overconfident agents tend to self-select into more competitive environments (e.g. Dohmen and Falk, 2006). In particular, it shows that moderate overconfidence in a contest can improve the agent's performance relative to an unbiased opponent and can even lead to an advantage of the overconfident agent in absolute terms.
Subjects: 
Overconfidence
Contests
JEL: 
D21
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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