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Title:Signaling in Deterministic and Stochastic Settings PDF Logo
Authors:Normann, Hans-Theo
Jeitschko, Thomas
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Game Theory and Applications B13-V3
Abstract:We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with deterministic signals, and less frequent types distort their signals relatively more. Moreover, the degree of congruence between equilibrium and subject behavior is greater in stochastic settings compared to deterministic treatments.
Subjects:experiments
noise
signalling
learning
stochastic environments
JEL:C72
C73
C91
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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