Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37420 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Monitoring and Mechanism Design No. B17-V3
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The assessment that the implementation of efficient outcomes by means of decentralized spontaneous solutions is to be expected for private goods, but not for public goods has become part of the conventional wisdom of our discipline. This paper uses a mechanism design approach to clarify under which conditions this proposition is indeed correct. The main result is that the following has to be satisfied: There is a large number of individuals and only mechanisms which are robust, in the sense that they do not exploit assumptions about individuals' probabilistic beliefs, are considered.
Schlagwörter: 
Public Goods
Private Goods
Robust Mechanism Design
Large Economy
JEL: 
D60
D80
H40
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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