Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37416
Authors: 
Gu, Yiquan
Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Oligopolistic Competition and Network Formation F9-V2
Abstract: 
Including the entry decision in a Bertrand model with imperfectly informed consumers, we introduce a trade-off at the level of social welfare. On the one hand, market transparency is beneficial when the number of firms is exogenously given. On the other, a higher degree of market transparency implies lower profits and hence makes it less attractive to enter the market in the first place. It turns out that the second effect dominates: too much market transparency has a detrimental effect on consumer surplus and on social welfare.
Subjects: 
Market transparency
Endogenous entry
Homogenous products
JEL: 
L13
L15
D43
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
164.87 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.