Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37403
Authors: 
Westheide, Christian
Gider, Jasmin
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Trading, Information, and Market Microstructure G18-V3
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the question of how the timing of corporate insider trading is related to the level of information asymmetry in a stock price. Our empirical analysis shows that, when buying their firm's shares, corporate insiders are likely to exploit their informational advantage through trading at times of high information asymmetry, while their selling appears more cautious because of reputational costs. Trading at times of high informational asymmetry pays off as abnormal returns increase in abnormal informational asymmetry. Further, we find that outside blockholdings, as a proxy for monitoring, can alleviate the exploitative behavior of insiders.
JEL: 
G34
G14
G18
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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