Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37366
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dc.contributor.authorWinkler, Ralphen_US
dc.contributor.authorQuaas, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:11:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37366-
dc.description.abstractEfficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction |xA15-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordauctioning-refunding-mechanismen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrenewable resourceen_US
dc.subject.keywordstochastic modelen_US
dc.subject.keywordsustainabilityen_US
dc.titleMarkets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refundingen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn654681570-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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