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Title:Markets for Sustainable Resource Use: Auctioned Limited-Tenure Use Rights with Refunding PDF Logo
Authors:Winkler, Ralph
Quaas, Martin
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Optimal Resource Extraction A15-V2
Abstract:Efficiency and sustainability often clash if limited-tenure use rights for renewable natural resources are rented to private resource managers. We introduce a mechanism reconciling these two issues for a stochastically developing natural resource. The mechanism selects the most patient and, thus, most sustainably harvesting resource manager in a second-price sealed-bid auction with minimum bids and it overcomes the incentive to mine the resource at the end of tenure by announcing a refund if a sustainability goal is obeyed. In addition, the mechanism ensures efficiency and is self-financing in expectation.
Subjects:auctioning-refunding-mechanism
efficiency
renewable resource
stochastic model
sustainability
JEL:Q20
D44
D82
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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