EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Rent-seeking Contests under Symmetric and Asymmetric Information PDF Logo
Authors:Wasser, Cédric
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Information and Contests D16-V3
Abstract:We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium strategies and prove their uniqueness. Then, we assume contestants to be privately informed about their costs of effort. We prove existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium and provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Comparing different informational settings we find that if players are uncertain about the costs of all players, aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Yet rent dissipation might still be smaller in the latter settings. Numerical examples provide additional insight into the impact of the information structure.
Asymmetric Information
Private values
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
VfS_2010_pid_555.pdf243.2 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.