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dc.contributor.authorSalim, Claudiaen_US
dc.description.abstractWe present the idea that quality cooperation and standardisation might raise network providers' incentives for product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterised by voluntary standardisation and maximum quality differentiation: This situation arises, if platforms compete in prices, but coordinate their quality provision, while the cost of quality provision is rather low. The result implies that firms might jointly agree to quality differences in order to offset consumers' taste for variety. Collusive qualities and standardization are socially more desirable than exclusivity with regard to investments. Nevertheless, quality competition and standardisation achieves the highest investments and maximum welfare.en_US
dc.publisherVerein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Two-Sided Markets and Vertical Restraints E8-V1en_US
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestment in transaction qualityen_US
dc.titlePlatform Standards, Collusion and Quality Incentivesen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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