Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37330
Authors: 
Salim, Claudia
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Two-Sided Markets and Vertical Restraints E8-V1
Abstract: 
We present the idea that quality cooperation and standardisation might raise network providers' incentives for product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterised by voluntary standardisation and maximum quality differentiation: This situation arises, if platforms compete in prices, but coordinate their quality provision, while the cost of quality provision is rather low. The result implies that firms might jointly agree to quality differences in order to offset consumers' taste for variety. Collusive qualities and standardization are socially more desirable than exclusivity with regard to investments. Nevertheless, quality competition and standardisation achieves the highest investments and maximum welfare.
Subjects: 
two-sided markets
standards
collusion
investment in transaction quality
JEL: 
D43
D62
L13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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