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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37324
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| Title: | | Transparency and Disclosing Conflicts of Interest: An Experimental Investigation  |
| Authors: | | Inderst, Roman Rajko, Alexander Ockenfels, Axel |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Game Theory and Applications B13-V1 |
| Abstract: | | Conflicts of interest have always been a problem in situation of advice giving between a client and a better informed advisor. Economic theory captures this matter by means of principal-agent models or games of information transmission. We experimentally investigate how different degrees of transparency about a conflict of interest influences individual decision making in a game of strategic information transmission. Even though transparency has significant effects, these are not all predicted by standard economic theory. For example, advisors are subject to an "over-communication effect". Similarly, when knowing about the deception, clients still do not sufficiently discount the biased information they receive. In conclusion, increasing transparency is not necessarily a good policy advice. |
| Subjects: | | Disclosure Conflict of Interest Experiment Principal-Agent Information Transmission Transparency |
| JEL: | | D82 D01 C91 |
| Document Type: | | Conference Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie
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