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Title:Can Competition Spoil Reciprocity? - A Laboratory Experiment PDF Logo
Authors:Bauernschuster, Stefan
Falck, Oliver
Große, Niels Daniel
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Social Preferences E13-V3
Abstract:This paper investigates how group membership and competition among trustors interact with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. To analyze these effects, we apply a 2x2 design. We induce group membership by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, leading to higher investments and trustworthiness. Introducing competition leads to a decrease in trustworthiness, especially among partners. We argue that once competition comes into play, trustees perceive trustors'investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than good intentions, which reduces reciprocity.
Subjects:trust
reciprocity
investment game
group membership
competition
JEL:C92
L14
Z13
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

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