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Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Chlaß, Nadine | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-08-11T08:56:32Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-08-11T08:56:32Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37253 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Games of imperfect information distribute information unevenly amongst parties. Recently, parties have been claimed to hold preferences purely over such procedural aspects. Here, I explore the impact purely procedural preferences exert if agents are without influence on the procedure itself. I design a game of imperfect information which exhibits extreme procedural asymmetry in that several procedural aspects advantage one and the same party over another. In an experimental test, parties are found to monetarily compensate the asymmetry such that almost no winner's curse results. I explain the compensation by an instrument for purely procedural preferences (Chlaß et al. 2009). The residual winner's curse links to personality traits. The game abstracts a management buy-in, the natural counterpart to a management buy-out. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M. | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Experimental Game Theory |xF13-V1 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D63 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | procedural preferences | en |
dc.subject.keyword | asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | winner's curse | en |
dc.title | The Impact of Procedural Asymmetry in Games of Imperfect Information | - |
dc.type | Conference Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 655741291 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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