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Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37204
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Buck, Florian | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-11T08:56:35Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-11T08:56:35Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37204 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This article provides a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of banking regulation on the risk-taking behavior of banks by incorporatig the incentives of three risk-neutral agents - the welfaristic regulator, the shareholder and the manager. While shareholders are assumed to maximize the discounted flow of bank profits, bank managers maximize expected income choosing from a menu of portfolios with different risk-return profiles. We show under which conditions capital requirements intensify the agency conflict between shareholders and bank managers if complete contracts are impossible. As a result, a government interested in alleviating this divergence will incorporate capital requirements to curb risk-appetite only in those cases in which managerial myopia and the probability of default in the banking-sector are not substantial. Moreover, our model suggests that direct regulation of a manager's bonus system is a substitute for any form of capital requirements. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Verein für Socialpolitik Frankfurt a. M. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Banking Regulation: Liquidity and Regulatory Capital A7-V3 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G28 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G38 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Subprime Crisis | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Banking regulation | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Managerial Prudence under Banking Regulation | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Conference Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 655736670 | | - |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010 (Kiel): Ökonomie der Familie
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