Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37179
Authors: 
von Schnurbein, Barbara
Belke, Ansgar
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Economic Policy in the EMU F16-V1
Abstract: 
We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.
Subjects: 
Euro area
European Central Bank
monetary policy
rotation
voting rights
JEL: 
D72
D78
E58
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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