EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37179
  
Title:European Monetary Policy and the ECB Rotation Model - On the Voting Power of the Core versus the Periphery PDF Logo
Authors:von Schnurbein, Barbara
Belke, Ansgar
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Economic Policy in the EMU F16-V1
Abstract:We analyze the ECB Governing Council's voting procedures. The literature has by now discussed numerous aspects of the rotation model but does not account for many institutional aspects of the voting procedure of the GC. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension (MLE) of games, we try to close three of these gaps. First, we integrate specific preferences of national central bank presidents, i.e. their desired interest rates. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we do not simulate an average of the decisions but look at every relevant point in time separately.
Subjects:Euro area
European Central Bank
monetary policy
rotation
voting rights
JEL:D72
D78
E58
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
VfS_2010_pid_416.pdf318.29 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37179

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.