Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171
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dc.contributor.authorvon Blanckenburg, Korbinianen_US
dc.contributor.authorGeist, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.authorKholodilin, Konstantin Arkadievichen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-11T09:03:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-11T09:03:59Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37171-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we compare the distribution of price changes between collusive and non-collusive periods for ten major cartels. The first moments focus on previous research. We extend the discussion to the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. However, none of the above descriptive statistics can be considered as a robust test allowing a differentiation between competition and cartel. Therefore, we implement the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. According to our results, 8 out of 10 cartels were successful in controlling the market price for a number of years. The proposed methodology may be used for antitrust screening and regulatory purposes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aVerein für Socialpolitik |cFrankfurt a. M.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Empirical Industrial Organization |xG9-V3en_US
dc.subject.jelL10en_US
dc.subject.jelL60en_US
dc.subject.jelL40en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcartel detectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen_US
dc.titleThe influence of collusion on price changes: New evidence from major cartel casesen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn655022996-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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