Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37161 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Asymmetric Information and Risk No. C8-V3
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper investigates political uncertainty as a source of regulatory risk. It shows that political parties have incentives to reduce regulatory risk actively: Mutually beneficial pre-electoral agreements that reduce regulatory risk always exist and fully eliminate it when political divergence is small or electoral uncertainty is appropriately skewed. These results follow from a fluctuation effect of regulatory risk that hurts both parties and an output-expansion effect that benefits at most one party. Due to commitment problems, politically independent regulatory agencies are needed to implement pre-electoral agreements. Optimal delegation may require only partial rather than full political independence.
Schlagwörter: 
regulation
regulatory risk
political economy
electoral uncertainty
independent regulatory agency
JEL: 
D82
L51
L12
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.