Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120
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dc.contributor.authorAnia, Ana B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWagener, Andreasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03T13:10:43Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-03T13:10:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120-
dc.description.abstractWe interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aWirtschaftswiss. Fak., Leibniz Univ. |cHannoveren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion papers // School of Economics and Management of the Hanover Leibniz University |x416en_US
dc.subject.jelH77en_US
dc.subject.jelH75en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOpen Method of Coordinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordFinite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategyen_US
dc.subject.keywordImitationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMobilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordRedistributionen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Politiken_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordinationen_US
dc.subject.stwEvolutionäre Spieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleThe open method of coordination (OMC) as an evolutionary learning processen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn601899946en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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