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Leibniz Universität Hannover >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Hannover >
Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Hannover >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Ania, Ana B. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Wagener, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-06-17 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-08-03T13:10:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-08-03T13:10:43Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37120 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule 'imitate the best.' In a redistribution game with utilitarian governments and mobile welfare beneficiaries, we compare the outcomes of imitative behavior (long-run evolutionary equilibrium), decentralized best-response behavior (Nash equilibrium), and coordinated policies. The main result is that the OMC allows policy coordination on a strict subset of the set of Nash equilibria, favoring in particular coordination on intermediate values of the policy instrument. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Wirtschaftswiss. Fak., Leibniz Univ. Hannover | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Discussion papers // School of Economics and Management of the Hanover Leibniz University 416 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H77 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H75 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Open Method of Coordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Finite-population Evolutionarily Stable Strategy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Imitation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Mobility | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Redistribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | EU-Politik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale wirtschaftspolitische Koordination | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Evolutionäre Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | EU-Staaten | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The open method of coordination (OMC) as an evolutionary learning process | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 601899946 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Diskussionspapiere, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Hannover
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