EconStor >
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37101
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorDe Rosa, Donatoen_US
dc.contributor.authorGooroochurn, Nishaalen_US
dc.contributor.authorGörg, Holgeren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03T13:09:37Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-03T13:09:37Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37101-
dc.description.abstractUsing enterprise data for the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS, this study examines the effects of corruption on productivity. Corruption is defined as a 'bribe tax' and is compared to another form of institutional inefficiency, which is often believed to be closely linked with corruption: the 'time tax' imposed on firms by red tape. When testing their effects in the full sample, only the bribe tax appears to have a negative effect on firm-level productivity, while the effect of the time tax is insignificant. At the same time, there is no evidence of a trade-off between the time and the bribe taxes, implying that bribing does not emerge as a second-best option to achieve higher productivity by helping circumvent cumbersome bureaucratic requirements. When the sample is split between EU and non-EU countries, the time tax turns out to have a negative effect only in EU countries and the bribe tax only in non-EU countries. This suggests that the institutional environment influences the way in which firm behaviour affects firm performance. In particular, the impact of bribing for individual firms appears to vary depending on overall institutional quality: in countries where corruption is more prevalent and the legal framework is weaker, bribery is more harmful for firm-level productivity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKiel working paper 1632en_US
dc.subject.jelO14en_US
dc.subject.jelP37en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordfirm performanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordproductivityen_US
dc.subject.keywordbribe taxen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwFolgekostenen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwProduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensentwicklungen_US
dc.subject.stwVergleichen_US
dc.subject.stwOsteuropaen_US
dc.subject.stwGUS-Staatenen_US
dc.subject.stwEU-Staatenen_US
dc.titleCorruption and productivity firm-level evidence from the BEEPS surveyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn630065640en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW
Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
630065640.pdf386.61 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.