Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37098 
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dc.contributor.authorWaichman, Israelen
dc.contributor.authorKorzhenevych, Artemen
dc.contributor.authorRequate, Tillen
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-13-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03T13:09:34Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-03T13:09:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37098-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we make use of a unique dataset collected in the central train station of Kiel, Germany. A group ticket is used by individual proposers who search for co-travelers to share the ride with shortly before the train departure. The bargaining behavior resembles the Ultimatum game to the extent that proposers request a fixed price for a shared ride and potential co-travelers usually accept or reject the deal. We observe that the prevailing price corresponds to the equal split of the ticket cost between the maximum possible number of co-travelers. This result is remarkable because the positions of the bargaining parties are hardly symmetric and the formation of the full group is not guaranteed. Using a simple agent-based model we are able to identify some sufficient conditions leading to the observed distribution of prices. Finally, we observed that the probability to accept an unusually high offer is decreasing with the price and increasing when the offer is made right before the train departure.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Paper |x1638en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC93en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNatural field experimenten
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordfocal pointen
dc.subject.keywordequal spliten
dc.subject.keywordagent-based modelen
dc.subject.stwEisenbahntarifen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen
dc.subject.stwEisenbahnpersonenverkehren
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwUltimatumspielen
dc.subject.stwFeldforschungen
dc.subject.stwAgent-based Modelen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleEqual split in the informal market for group train travel-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn631007059en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1638en

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