Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37074 
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dc.contributor.authorLammers, Fraukeen
dc.contributor.authorSchiller, Jörgen
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-26-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-30T07:20:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-30T07:20:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-4879en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37074-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of insurance contract design on the behavior of filing fraudulent claims in an experimental setup. We test how fraud behavior varies for insurance contracts with full coverage, a straight deductible or variable premiums (bonus-malus contract). In our experiment, filing fraudulent claims is a dominant strategy for selfish participants, with no psychological costs of committing fraud. While some people always commit fraud, a substantial share of people only occasionally or never defraud. In addition, we find that deductible contracts may be perceived as unfair and thus increase the extent of claim build-up compared to full coverage contracts. In contrast, bonus-malus contracts with variable insurance premiums significantly reduce the filing of fictitious claims compared to both full coverage and deductible contracts. This reduction cannot be explained by monetary incentives. Our results indicate that contract design significantly affects psychological costs and, consequently, the extent of fraudulent behavior of policyholders.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Hohenheim, Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung (FZID) |cStuttgarten
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFZID Discussion Paper |x19-2010en
dc.subject.jelG22en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordInsurance frauden
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen
dc.subject.keyworddeductibleen
dc.subject.keywordbonus-malusen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsbetrugen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsprämieen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleContract design and insurance fraud: An experimental investigation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn631973575en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fziddp:192010en

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