Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37074
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorLammers, Fraukeen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchiller, Jörgen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-30T07:20:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-30T07:20:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-4879en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37074-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of insurance contract design on the behavior of filing fraudulent claims in an experimental setup. We test how fraud behavior varies for insurance contracts with full coverage, a straight deductible or variable premiums (bonus-malus contract). In our experiment, filing fraudulent claims is a dominant strategy for selfish participants, with no psychological costs of committing fraud. While some people always commit fraud, a substantial share of people only occasionally or never defraud. In addition, we find that deductible contracts may be perceived as unfair and thus increase the extent of claim build-up compared to full coverage contracts. In contrast, bonus-malus contracts with variable insurance premiums significantly reduce the filing of fictitious claims compared to both full coverage and deductible contracts. This reduction cannot be explained by monetary incentives. Our results indicate that contract design significantly affects psychological costs and, consequently, the extent of fraudulent behavior of policyholders.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. Hohenheim, Forschungszentrum Innovation und Dienstleistung |cStuttgarten_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aFZID discussion papers |x19-2010en_US
dc.subject.jelG22en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordInsurance frauden_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontract designen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeductibleen_US
dc.subject.keywordbonus-malusen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsbetrugen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsprämieen_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleContract design and insurance fraud: An experimental investigationen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn631973575en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fziddp:192010-

Files in This Item:
File
Size
522.95 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.