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Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37039
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| Title: | | Minimum wages and excessive effort supply  |
| Authors: | | Kräkel, Matthias Schöttner, Anja |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2009,8 |
| Abstract: | | It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers future rents to induce excessively high effort. |
| Subjects: | | bonuses limited liability minimum wages |
| JEL: | | D82 D86 J33 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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