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Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37037
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| Title: | | Standard breach remedies, quality thresholds, and cooperative investments  |
| Authors: | | Stremitzer, Alexander |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Bonn econ discussion papers 2009,4 |
| Abstract: | | When investments are nonverifiable, inducing cooperative investments with simple contracts may not be as difficult as previously thought. Indeed, modeling expectation damages close to legal practice, we show that the default remedy of contract law induces the first best. Yet, in order to lower informational requirements of courts, parties may opt for a specific performance regime which grants the breachedagainst buyer an option to choose restitution if the tender's value falls below some (arbitrarily chosen) quality threshold. In order to implement this regime, no more information needs to be verifiable than is implicitly assumed in Che and Hausch (1999). |
| Subjects: | | breach remedies incomplete contracts cooperative investments |
| JEL: | | K12 L22 J41 C70 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Universität Bonn
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