Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/37036
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dc.contributor.authorKräkel, Matthiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-09en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-29T10:08:55Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-29T10:08:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/37036-
dc.description.abstractWe show that in competitive careers based on individual performance the least productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices by the more talented individuals.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aGraduate School of Economics |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBonn econ discussion papers |x2009,25en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelJ44en_US
dc.subject.jelJ45en_US
dc.subject.jelM51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcareer competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontesten_US
dc.subject.keywordmediocracyen_US
dc.subject.stwErwerbsverlaufen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsorientierte Vergütungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompetitive careers as a way to mediocracyen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn614621259en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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